Discrimination in an Equilibrium Search Model
构建了一个均衡搜寻模型，其中部分雇主对雇佣少数族裔工人有偏见，并证明这种偏见会导致对少数族裔工人的经济歧视。模型表明，即使只有无偏见的公司雇佣少数族裔工人，只要市场中有雇主存在偏见，少数族裔工人的工资就会低于不受歧视的工人。
The author constructs an equilibrium search model where some employers have a distaste for hiring minority workers and shows that this bias results in economic discrimination against minority workers. Although only unprejudiced firms hire minority workers, minority workers receive lower wages than workers not facing discrimination whenever any employers in the market have a distaste for minority workers. One implication of the model is that gender or racial wage differentials understate the utility loss from discrimination. In addition, the wages of minority workers increase when their proportion increases in the labor market. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.