Posterior odds comparison of a symmetric low-price, sealed-bid auction within the common-value and the independent-private-values paradigms
利用后验几率比，判断印度石油公司从国际市场采购原油的低价密封投标拍卖更符合对称共同价值范式还是对称独立私人价值范式，结论支持后者。
I attempt to decide, using the posterior odds ratio, whether the symmetric common-value paradigm or the symmetric independent-private-values paradigm is a more probable explanation of the low-price, sealed-bid auctions conducted by the Indian Oil Corporation to purchase crude-oil from the international market. The estimation approach is structural parametric. The auctions are modelled as static non-cooperative games of incomplete information with risk neutral bidders. I conclude that the symmetric independent-private-values paradigm is more probable. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.