Theories and Tests of "Blind Bidding" in Sealed-bid Auctions
通过实验室市场实验，研究卖家比买家更了解商品质量时，卖家选择是否披露信息或盲拍的行为，发现买家最坏假设的序贯均衡模型能较好预测行为，且市场最终配置趋于完全有效。
In this article we report the results from a series of laboratory markets in which sellers have better information about the quality of an item than any of the potential buyers. Sellers may voluntarily choose to reveal this information or they may instead decide to blind bid the item. We find that a sequential equilibrium model where buyers assume the worst is a good predictor of behavior in these simple markets. This equilibrium is not instantaneously attained, however, but there is an unraveling process which describes how this equilibrium is approached. At the conclusion of the market, allocations tend to be full efficient, ex post.