The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Constitutions
用重复博弈模型分析监管，发现承诺合理回报率的回报率监管比无承诺的回报率监管和价格监管更能支持高效投资，对研究监管设计的学者有参考价值。
In this article, we model regulation as a repeated game between a utility facing a random sequence of demands and a regulator tempted to underreward past investment. Rate-of-return regulation designed with a constitutional commitment to an adequate rate of return on capital prudently invested is able to support an efficient investment program as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for a larger set of parameter values than rate-of-return regulation without such a commitment. Furthermore, rate-of-return regulation is superior to price regulation according to the same criterion, assuming that the regulator is unable to make state-contingent transfer payments.