Information Revelation and Principal-Agent Contracts
研究在努力程度为工人私人信息时，风险中性委托人与风险厌恶代理人之间的合同如何影响薪酬与就业规则，发现此类合同通常导致不完全收入保险和过度失业，为道德风险下的失业现象提供解释。
In an environment in which effort is private information to the worker, agreements between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-a verse agent are likely to be risk-sharing and information-revealing m echanisms. It is shown that principal-agent contracts have significan t implications for both compensation and employment rules in a simple work-sharing model. In general, such contracts involve incomplete in come insurance and involuntary or excessive underemployment. This sup ports the view that models of worker-specific information, particular ly with moral hazard, provide a natural explanation of underemploymen t. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.