EXPLORING THE AGENCY CONSEQUENCES OF OWNERSHIP DISPERSION AMONG THE DIRECTORS OF PRIVATE FAMILY FIRMS.
基于代理理论和行为经济学，研究私人家族企业中所有权分散程度对债务使用的影响，发现市场增长期两者呈U型关系。
Using an agency theoretic lens and insights drawn from the behavioral economics and family business literatures, we develop hypotheses concerning the effect of dispersion of ownership on the use of debt by private family-owned and managed firms. Results from a field study of 1,464 family firms suggest that during periods of market growth the relationship between the use of debt and the dispersion of ownership among directors at family firms is U-shaped. In Press- AMJ The principal-agent model has had a profound influence on corporate governance theory (Jensen, 1998). A central premise of this theory is that management decisions are strongly influenced by the agency position of the individual decision-makers who serve on the board of directors. The agency positions of outside owners and owner-managers differ. Outside owners prefer growth-oriented risk-taking because they benefit solely from the appreciation of shareholder value. They are also indifferent to the level of risk that is specific to any particular