THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION DECISIONS
用英国股市数据研究垄断与并购委员会干预对竞标公司股价的影响，发现委员会并未阻止可能带来垄断利润的收购，但可能迫使非股东利益最大化的收购流产。
This paper presents an analysis of the policy of the UK's Monopolies and Mergers Commission using stock market data. Stock price reactions to regula‐tory intervention by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission might be expected to reflect two sorts of factors. Firstly, the impact of the intervention on the possibility of bidders extracting monopoly profits from consumers. Secondly, the possibility that the subsequent investigation of the bid by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission will raise the cost of a bid, which may not necessarily be in the shareholder's interests, and so cause such bids to be abandoned. Studying a sample of some 53 bids, investigated by the Commission in the period 1976–90, little evidence was found that the Commission halts bids that are likely to result in monopoly profits to the bidder but there was some weak evidence that non‐shareholder wealth maximising bids are abandoned as a result of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission intervention.