Disciplining exporting state trading enterprises under economies of scale and oligopoly
构建两阶段双寡头模型，分析WTO农业谈判中取消对国营贸易企业补贴的效果，发现取消补贴可能改变市场结构，甚至导致私人企业垄断。
The paper develops a two-stage duopoly model to investigate the effects of eliminating subsidies to state trading enterprises (STEs) as discussed in the WTO Doha Development Agenda negotiations on agriculture. Unlike the STE, the private firm may choose to integrate vertically in order to avoid transaction costs arising from dealing with downstream operators. The theoretical model shows that eliminating subsidies to the STE may induce a change in market structure and not necessarily lead to increased competition. In fact, if transaction costs are large enough relative to fixed costs, then the result may be a monopoly by the private firm.