Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 1995–2000
发现1990年代末英格兰和威尔士批发电力市场中发电商行使了相当大的市场势力，尽管市场集中度下降，但两大发电商的行为与默契合谋一致。
This article shows that generators exercised considerable market power in the England and Wales wholesale electricity market in the late 1990s. This is surprising because static oligopoly models predict that falling market concentration should have reduced market power. The article tests the equilibrium assumption of these models that each generator's bids should maximise its short-run profits given the bids of other generators. It finds that the two largest generators could have profitably increased their output from the beginning of 1997. Their behaviour was consistent with tacit collusion. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.