Hierarchical Regulatory Control
研究消费者（或国会）、监管者和垄断企业之间的层级控制问题，分析如何通过设计扭曲来激励监管者获取专业知识并有效控制企业，同时激励企业以最低成本生产。
We consider a regulatory problem in which there is a hierarchy of control. Consumers (or Congress) direct the activities of a regulator, who, in turn, oversees the activities of a monopolistic firm. Both the regulator and the firm are self-interested actors. The regulator must be motivated to acquire the expertise that allows him to control the firm's activities more effectively. The firm must be motivated to produce at minimal cost to consumers. We characterize the distortions in the firm's activities that are optimally induced to control more effectively the activities of the firm and the regulator.