Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Chemical Use in Agriculture
研究美国中西部玉米种植户的作物保险如何影响化肥和农药使用，发现购买保险的农户显著增加氮肥和农药投入，表明道德风险导致化学品使用增加。
Abstract This paper examines how crop insurance affects corn farmers' fertilizer and pesticide use in the U.S. Midwest. Crop insurance might be expected to affect chemical use because of “moral hazard”; insured farmers may undertake riskier production than do uninsured farmers. Results suggest that insurance exerts considerable influence on corn farmers' chemical use decisions. Those purchasing insurance applied significantly more nitrogen per acre (19%), spent more on pesticides (21%), and treated more acreage with both herbicides and insecticides (7% and 63%) than did those not purchasing insurance. These results suggest that both fertilizer and pesticides may be risk‐increasing inputs.