A Survey of Managerial Incentives and Investment Bias — Common Structure but Differing Assumptions
综述了委托代理框架下关于投资偏差的最新模型，基于信息不对称的简化结构，提供了合同结构、关键假设及结果的表格概览，指出未来应关注经济基本面而非假设变体，并需加强实证检验。
Recent models within the agency framework concerning investment bias are reviewed, based upon a simplified structure of the pertinent information asymmetry. Tabulated overviews of contractual structures, critical assumptions, main and ancillary results, implications for future research and management are provided. As a general conclusion, the theoretical case of investment bias is rich and wide‐ranging. It is now of interest to develop models and perspectives that focus more on economic fundamentals rather than pursuing additional variations of particular assumptions. Moreover, further research is needed in empirical testing and case studies. In particular, the framework promises to bring new perspectives and managerial implications on the administrative use of capital budgeting methods.