Team Incentives in Relational Employment Contracts
分析在委托人与两名互动代理人之间的关系合同中，基于联合、相对和独立绩效的激励方案实施条件，发现代理人生产率影响委托人违约诱惑，从而决定最优激励制度。
The article analyzes conditions for implementing incentive schemes based on, respectively, joint, relative, and independent performance in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two interacting agents. A main result is that the optimal incentive regime depends crucially on the productivity of the agents. This occurs because agents' productivities affect the principal's temptation to renege on the relational contract. The analysis suggests that we will see a higher frequency of relative performance evaluationand schemes that lie close to independent performance evaluationas we move from low-productive to high-productive environments.