PRICE AND LOCATION CONJECTURES IN MEDIUM‐ AND LONG‐RUN SPATIAL COMPETITION MODELS*
研究了无界（圆形）和有界（线性）一维多厂商市场的中期和长期均衡，通过价格-位置调整模型模拟厂商预期对手反应时的空间均衡，并提供了三种价格猜想的比较静态分析。
ABSTRACT. This paper examines medium‐run and long‐run equilibria in unbounded (circular) and bounded (linear) one‐dimensional multifirm markets. A price‐location adjustment model is outlined that dows simulation of the spatial equilibrium when these firms anticipate reactions from their nearest spatial rivals. Thus, the market equilibrium is derived from the interdependent but atomistic decisions of the competing firms and is not imposed by some outside observer or agency. Ail conjectures are exogenous; the three well‐known price conjectures (Greenhut‐Ohta, Hotelling‐Smithies, and Losch) are highlighted; and the relevant comparative statics are provided.