Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials: Evidence from State Trial Court Judges
研究任命与选举两种公职人员选拔制度如何影响政策结果，以州法院法官的刑事量刑决策为例，发现任命制通过筛选同质偏好实现政策一致，而选举制依赖连任激励，其效果受职位回报影响，且连任激励可能使高人力资本法官不愿任职。
We study how two selection systems for public officials, appointment and election, affect policy outcomes, focusing on state court judges and their criminal sentencing decisions. First, under appointment, policy congruence with voter preferences is attained through selecting judges with homogeneous preferences. In contrast, under election, judges face strong reelection incentives, while selection on preferences is weak. Second, the effectiveness of election in attaining policy congruence critically depends on payoffs from the job, which implies that the effectiveness of election may vary substantially across public offices. Third, reelection incentives may discourage judges with significant human capital from holding office.