Marginal Employment Subsidization: A New Concept and a Reappraisal*
重新审视边际就业补贴，提出对新增就业和在职员工双重补贴可避免外包替代，并以德国低技能劳动力市场为例证明该方案能大幅增加就业且不增加财政负担。
SUMMARY In this paper, we attempt to renew the interest in marginal employment subsidies. Such subsidies are paid only for a firm's additional employment exceeding some reference level and create larger employment stimuli at lower fiscal costs than general wage subsidies for all workers. If the hiring of a new employee also entails subsidizing an incumbent worker (double marginal subsidization), the replacement of regular paid workers by outsourcing employment to newly established firms – a standard critique of marginal employment subsidies – can be avoided. This additional subsidy reduces the incentive to crowd out regular employment and results in even larger employment effects. Applying the subsidy scheme to the low‐skill labor market in Germany, we show that employment can be substantially increased without imposing additional fiscal burden.