Cooperation and Punishment
研究重复共同利益博弈中，扰动策略必须包含最大惩罚的“严苛”策略才能保证效率，并指出合作性扰动策略的效率结果源于信念限制而非可计算性。
We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong ‘perturbation implies efficiency’ results require that the perturbations must include strategies that are ‘draconian’ in the sense that they are prepared to punish to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, there is a draconian strategy whose presence in the perturbations guarantees that any equilibrium is efficient. We also argue that the results of Anderlini and Sabourian (1995) using perturbation strategies that are cooperative (and hence nondraconian) are not due to computability per se but to the further restrictions they impose on allowable beliefs.