Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
研究卖家是否应让买家获取关于自身偏好的私人信息，以帮助卖家进行市场细分和价格歧视，但信息也可能给买家带来租金，最终卖家要么提供最佳信息，要么不提供。
The authors examine the incentive of a seller to allow potential buyers to acquire private information about their tastes for the seller's product. Improved private information for buyers enables the seller to segment the market and charge higher prices to high-value buyers. However, improved information can also provide rents to buyers. In a variety of settings, this tradeoff is optimally resolved at one of two extremes: either buyers are supplied with the best available knowledge of their tastes or no information is supplied by the seller. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.