A Model of the Political Economy of International Investment Sanctions: The Case of South Africa
构建了一个南非国家的利益集团模型，将种族隔离政策视为政治决策的内生结果，分析撤资制裁如何通过影响白人选民中主要利益集团的财富和政治成本，来改变种族隔离制度的存续。
SUMMARY Many advocates of sanctions against South Africa have proposed that such measures will reduce the wealth of white South Africans and thereby raise the costs of apartheid to those who benefit from it by such a large amount that whites will voluntarily choose to terminate the apartheid system. This paper examines the likely effects of disinvestment sanctions on the survivability of apartheid. An ‘interest‐group’ model of the South African state is developed, in which apartheid policies are treated as endogenous outcomes of a political decision‐making process. The effects of sanctions are introduced through the impact of international capital flows and asset prices on the major interest groups within the white electorate. It is shown that disinvestment policies may not diminish apartheid via market effects, but could have an impact upon the political costs of maintaining apartheid institutions.