Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior
构建了一个模型，说明在理性股票市场中，经理人为了误导市场而牺牲好投资以抬高当前盈利，导致短视行为，但市场并未被愚弄。该模型有助于评估“短视”争论中的证据，并对企业结构和整合限制有新的启示。
This paper develops a model of inefficient managerial behavior in the face of a rational stock market In an effort to mislead the market about their firms' worth, managers forsake good investments so as to boost current earnings. In equilibrium the market is efficient and is not fooled: it correctly conjectures that there will be earnings inflation, and adjusts for this in making inferences. Nonetheless, managers, who take the market's conjectures as fixed, continue to behave myopically. The model is useful in assessing evidence that has been presented in che "myopia" debate. It also yields some novel implications regarding firm structure and the limits of intergation.