The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation
分析了一个单边信息不完全的序贯谈判模型，若未达成协议则进入法庭审理，发现截止日期效应和U形和解模式，并证明即使信息完全也存在低效均衡。
A model of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information is analyzed where, if an agreement is not reached, the agents go to court. A "deadline effect" emerges where much settlement occurs just prior to the trial, and many cases proceed to court. If fixed costs are incurred during each bargaining period, a "U-shaped" pattern of settlement emerges. These patterns persist in the limit as the time between offers approaches zero. A model with an endogenous trial date is also considered, and it is shown that even with complete information, there exist inefficient equilibria where disputes are resolved in court.