How (Not) to Raise Money
指出标准赢家付款拍卖因正外部性而抑制收入，不适用于筹款；而全付款拍卖（包括彩票）能克服此问题，并引入一类全付款拍卖，证明其优于赢家付款格式，最优机制是附加入场费和保留价的全付款拍卖。
We show that standard winner‐pay auctions are inept fund‐raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another's high bid. Revenues are suppressed as a result and remain finite even when bidders value a dollar donated the same as a dollar kept. This problem does not occur in lotteries and all‐pay auctions, where bidders pay irrespective of whether they win. We introduce a general class of all‐pay auctions, rank their revenues, and illustrate how they dominate lotteries and winner‐pay formats. The optimal fund‐raising mechanism is an all‐pay auction augmented with an entry fee and reserve price.