Did J. P. Morgan's Men Add Liquidity? Corporate Investment, Cash Flow, and Financial Structure at the Turn of the Twentieth Century
研究J.P.摩根合伙公司与其客户企业的关系是否通过减少代理问题和信息不对称，缓解了后者的外部融资困难。通过比较摩根关联公司与非关联公司的投资回归方程，发现非关联公司似乎面临流动性约束。
ABSTRACT This article presents evidence suggesting that the relationship that existed between the partnership of J. P. Morgan and its client firms partially resolved the latter's external financing problems by diminishing the principal‐agent and asymmetric information problems. I estimate and compare investment regression equations for a sample of Morgan‐affiliated companies and a control group of nonaffiliated companies. The econometric results seem to indicate that companies not affiliated to the House of Morgan were liquidity constrained.