Bargaining asymmetry in technology transfer; A games theoretical approach
用合作博弈论解释技术转让中议价结果的不对称，认为基于成本收益分析的剩余估值高于国内市场价格时，企业会获得更多财务剩余，且对称信息下成本收益技术对企业和政府同样重要。
The present paper, by use of a cooperative game theoretical construct, attempts to provide a theoretical basis for the observed asymmetry of POI technology bargaining outcomes which does not depend on assumptions of imperfect knowledge, unequal bargaining strength and the like. In particular, it is argued that where the valuation of surplus based on cost‐ benefit analysis exceeds that which results from the use of domestic market prices, the division of financial surplus will favour the firm. A corollary is that since such an outcome depends on symmetrical information, the use of cost‐benefit techniques will be as important to firms as to governments. The argument deals with the role of accounting conventions in determining taxable surplus, and is extended to cover various forms of surplus disguise, of which the use of transfer pricing is the standard example.