超速、恐怖主义与应试教学

Speeding, Terrorism, and Teaching to the Test*

Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2006
被引 161
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

用超速驾驶的比喻分析应试教育,指出最优考试规则取决于学习和监控成本,对高成本学习者应明确考试要求,对能力强者则模糊标准效果更好。

Abstract

Educators worry that high-stakes testing will induce teachers and their students to focus only on the test and ignore other, untested aspects of knowledge. Some counter that although this may be true, knowing something is better than knowing nothing and many students would benefit even by learning the material that is to be tested. Using the metaphor of deterring drivers from speeding, it is shown that the optimal rules for high-stakes testing depend on the costs of learning and of monitoring. Incentives need to be concentrated for those whose costs of action are high. For high cost learners this implies announcing the exact requirements of the test. For more able students, a more amorphous standard produces superior results. This is analogous to announcing where the police are when the detection costs are high. Other applications are discussed.

应试教学高风险测试最优激励学习成本