可信的审前谈判

Credible Pretrial Negotiation

RAND Journal of Economics · 1987
被引 321
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

研究原告在审前谈判中如何通过调整和解要价来维持诉讼威胁的可信性,发现当可信性约束生效时,传统比较静态结论会反转,且被告反而希望原告的威胁可信。

Abstract

Pretrial negotiation is a structured environment in which to study bargaining with incomplete information. When a plaintiff believes that a defendant owes him damages, he may first attempt to reach a private settlement before resorting to a costly court-imposed judgment. A central issue in their negotiations is whether the plaintiff's threat to litigate is credible. It is possible for the plaintiff to undermine the credibility of his litigation threat by making a settlement demand that is insufficient. As a result, the plaintiff must raise his settlement demand to limit the amount of bad news he can learn if his offer is rejected. When this credibility constraint is binding, traditional comparative static results are reversed. In addition, even though the defendant is being sued, he wants the plaintiff's threat to be credible.

可信谈判诉讼威胁不完全信息和解谈判