Noise Trading and Takeovers
构建了一个收购模型，其中噪声交易为外部大股东提供掩护，使其能以有利价格购入足够股份，从而使收购有利可图。模型表明，即使没有稀释效应或大股东存在，噪声交易也能促使原本不会发生的成本高昂的收购，并阻碍原本有益的收购。
A model of takeovers is investigated in which noise provides camouflage that makes it possible for a large corporate outsider to purchase enough shares at favorable prices so that takeovers become profitable. Although the model accommodates the possibility of dilution (Grossman and Hart, 1980) and a large incumbent shareholder (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), neither dilution nor a large incumbent shareholder is necessary for costly takeovers to be profitable. Noise trading tends to encourage costly takeovers that otherwise would not occur and to discourage beneficial takeovers that otherwise would occur.