Optimal Capital Structure in Agency Relationships
分析风险厌恶的委托人如何通过控制代理人的资本结构来优化激励，发现委托人会根据代理人生产率高低决定外部股权比例，并让股东承担生产风险和未知生产率风险。
We analyze the optimal design of capital structure in agency relationships. When a risk-averse principal controls the agent's capital structure, she awards a larger equity stake to outsiders the smaller the agent's productivity. When she controls both the timing and the terms of the agent's financing, the principal shifts to equityholders all risk associated with stochastic production and with the agent's unknown productivity. When the principal dictates only the terms of financing, only the former risk is borne by equityholders. When the principal is sufficiently averse to risk, she affords the agent no choice among incentive schemes.