Incentives and Innovation: A Multitasking Approach
构建了一个多任务模型，分析员工在标准任务与创新机会之间的选择，发现创新对企业越专用，标准任务的激励越弱，但均衡中创新仍不足；反之则过度。还探讨了失败容忍、股权薪酬和知识产权分配等促进创新的措施。
This paper develops a multitask model where employees make choices between their assigned standard tasks, for which the firm has a performance measure and provides incentives, and privately observed innovation opportunities that fall outside of the performance metrics, and require ex post bargaining. If innovations are highly firm specific, firms provide lower-powered incentives for standard tasks to encourage more innovation, yet in equilibrium employees undertake too few innovations. The opposite occurs if innovations are less firm specific. We also investigate the effectiveness of several possibilities to encourage innovation, such as tolerance for failure, stock-based compensation, and the allocation of intellectual property rights.