An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects
提出一种新的升价拍卖方法，用于国债或频谱等同质物品，能实现与维克里拍卖相同的高效结果，但更简单且保护隐私，在相互依赖价值情形下仍可能保持效率。
When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.