External control, corporate strategy, and firm performance in research‐intensive industries
探讨管理者与股东利益分歧如何影响公司战略选择，发现股东主导时企业更倾向创新战略，管理者主导时更倾向多元化战略，且创新战略比多元化战略更能提升企业盈利能力。
Abstract This paper explores the proposition that the divergence of interest between managers and stockholders has implications for corporate strategy and firm profitability. Stockholders prefer strategies which maximize their wealth. Managers prefer strategies which maximize their utility. It is theorized that in research‐intensive industries, when stockholders dominate, innovation strategies are favored. When managers dominate, diversification strategies are favored. In addition, innovation is argued to be associated with greater firm profitability than diversification. This theory is tested on 94 Fortune 500 firms drawn from research‐intensive industries. The results largely confirm theoretical expectations.