Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
研究同质商品在时间维度上的双寡头竞争，假设当前需求取决于过去消费的指数加权函数，导致价格调整缓慢。通过微分博弈分析，发现开环纳什均衡价格趋近静态古诺均衡，而闭环纳什均衡价格更低。
The authors study duopolistic competition in a homogeneous good through time under the assumption that its current desirability is an exponentially-weighted function of accumulated past consumption. This implies that the current price of the good does not decline by as much to accommodate any given level of current consumption. Our an alysis is conducted in terms of a differential game. It is found that the equilibrium price corresponding to the open-loop Nash equilibriu m strategies approaches the static Cournot equilibrium price while th e equilibrium price corresponding to the closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies, which are subgame perfect, approaches a price below it. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.