The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures
研究发现，在收益对称时，显著标签能促进协调；但一旦收益出现微小不对称，标签效果大减，导致大量协调失败，且失败模式随收益差异大小复杂变化，指向非均衡解释。
Since Schelling, it has often been assumed that players make use of salient decision labels to achieve coordination. Consistent with previous work, we find that given equal payoffs, salient labels yield frequent coordination. However, given even minutely asymmetric payoffs, labels lose much of their effectiveness and miscoordination abounds. This raises questions about the extent to which the effectiveness of focal points based on label salience persists beyond the special case of symmetric games. The patterns of miscoordination we observe vary with the magnitude of payoff differences in intricate ways that suggest nonequilibrium accounts based on “level-k” thinking and “team reasoning.”