A Sorting-cum-Learning Model of Education
构建了一个教育排序模型，假设高能力个体更易通过考试，从而不依赖非金钱成本差异。模型存在纳什均衡，但部分不合理，需更严格定义。当教育影响生产率时，均衡可能教育投资不足。
This paper presents a sorting model of education in which individuals are tested in school. By assuming that higher-ability individuals are more likely to succeed on a given test, one can construct a sorting model of education that does not hinge on the more able having lower nonpecuniary costs of schooling. Nash equilibria always exist in this model (even with a continuum of types of individuals); however, some are "unreasonable." To eliminate these unreasonable Nash equilibria, more restrictive definitions of equilibrium are proposed. I also show that when schooling affects productivity--and therefore a worker's probability of passing the test--a sorting equilibrium may be characterized by too little investment in education.