The Competitive Implications of Top-of-the-Market and Related Contract-Pricing Clauses
研究合同定价条款（如牛肉采购中的市场顶部定价）如何将合同价格与后续现货价格挂钩，并发现此类条款会削弱买家在现货市场的竞争，对生产者不利。
This article examines the competitive implications of contract pricing arrangements, which link the contract price to the subsequent cash price. We focus on so-called “top-of-the-market pricing” (TOMP) in cattle procurement. The TOMP clause is shown to have anticompetitive consequences when the same buyers who purchase contract cattle with the TOMP clause also compete to procure cattle in the subsequent spot market. The TOMP clause reduces packers' incentives to compete aggressively in the spot market. Although TOMP pricing is not in producers' collective interest, rational sellers may nonetheless sign these contracts with little or no financial inducement. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.