Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry
研究在自然垄断行业中，潜在进入者如何通过无成本、无约束力的沟通（廉价对话）实现部分协调，但无法实现完全协调，适用于完全信息讨价还价或兼容性标准选择等场景。
We show how costless, nonbinding, nonverifiable communication (cheap talk) can achieve partial coordination among potential entrants into a natural-monopoly industry, where the payoffs are qualitatively like the battle of the sexes. The analysis would apply equally in other economic situations with such payoffs, for example, bargaining under complete information or choosing compatibility standards. While cheap talk helps achieve asymmetric coordination in a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, it cannot achieve complete coordination if the game involves even a small amount of conflict.