Dividend Policy and Reputation
研究企业用股利传递盈利信号时声誉的作用，发现考虑声誉后信号成本可内生且存在分离均衡，但若允许管理者每期反转股利决策，信号均衡常不稳定，使股利信号政策难以实施。
Abstract: We examine the role of reputation when firms use dividends to signal their profitability. We analyze a signaling model in which reputation plays no role in equilibrium. We then show that taking reputation into account as a link between sequential dividend decisions makes it possible to endogenize signaling costs and obtain a separating equilibrium. Lastly, we use the reversibility hypothesis and assume that in each period, managers can reverse their choices in terms of dividend distribution. We find that in most cases, the signaling equilibrium becomes unstable, causing any dividend signaling policy to become difficult to implement.