Falsificationism and Fallibilism as Epistemic Foundations of Economics: A Critical View
批判了波普尔式证伪主义和可错主义作为经济学方法论和认识论基础的适用性，指出前者忽视经济理论的启发式性质，后者混淆了实践理性与科学理性，并提出了替代性建议。
SUMMARY A new awareness of the major issues in the contemporary philosophy of science is one of the most remarkable features of current debates on economic methodology. Under the prevailing influence of POPPER'S writings, for example, it has been repeatedly maintained that POPPERian falsificationism ought to be regarded as the proper methodological framework for the appraisal of economic theories . More recently, it has also been argued we should see POPPERian fallibilism as the right epistemological perspective for approaching the problem of agents' behaviour in economic theory. This paper suggests that both such perspectives are doomed to failure: the former because of the heuristic nature of most economic theories, the latter for having overlooked the sharp contrast between ‘practical’ and ‘scientific’ rationality which is so typical of POPPERian epistemology. As often the case when methodology is concerned, criticism is easier than the provision of a sound alternative. We suggest, however, that a fallibilist economist and a falsificationist economic man could do economics a much better service than vice versa.