A detour on the road to the market: Coordination, queues, and the distribution of income
研究计划经济改革中政府面临的政策选择：协调问题（收入不确定性和规模经济）限制了对私营部门的控制，而国有部门员工偏好高税收政策，导致低工资但排队隐含收益上升。
We examine the policy choices of a planned economy engaged in economic reform. Problems of coordination characteristic of immature markets—uncertainty in income and economies of scale in the organization of the sector—may limit the government's ability to control the growth of the private sector. Further, the government's constituents, who typically work in the state sector and have time to wait in queues, often prefer that the government levy high taxes on private firms. Although this policy necessitates a low state-sector wage to maintain the sectoral distribution of workers, the implicit wage from waiting in queues rises.