Migration and Imperfect Monitoring: Implications for Intra-Household Allocation
研究迁移对留守家庭的影响，指出当家庭成员不共同居住时，某些分配只能被不完全监督，导致家庭决策可能不完全合作，从而影响支出模式和资源分配。
Studies of the impact of migration on sending households (e.g., Dean Yang, 2004; Alejandra C. Edwards and Manuelita Ureta, 2003) have largely neglected the fact that certain allocations can only be imperfectly monitored when household members are not coresident (see Ralph Chami et al., 2003, for an exception). In this case, allocations can be coordinated only to the extent that they can be verified, and household decision making may not be fully cooperative. The existence of such behavior among household members would suggest that expanding opportunities for migration will have different effects on expenditure patterns than simply increasing the amount of income received by the household. Changes in earned income and the potential to earn income will affect bargaining among spouses, but noncooperative behavior will have an additional effect on the final distribution of household resources. With the