The Quality of Export Products and Optimal Trade Policy
证明，当质量认知存在信息外部性且执行社会合意质量成本高昂时，自愿出口限制可提升出口产品质量，最优贸易政策需限制出口行业的规模和厂商数量，并配合出口许可证与特定生产税补贴组合。
This paper demonstrates that voluntary export restraints may be socially desirable to upgrade the quality of export products. When informational externalities in the recognition of quality result in suboptimal production of quality by competitive firms and the enforcement of socially desirable quality is very costly, optimal trade policy calls for export restrictions. These restrictions apply to both size and number of firms in the export industry. Export licenses combined with a specific production tax cum subsidy represent a suitable pair of instruments. Copyright 1987 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.