Ownership Concentration and the Theory of the Firm: A Simple-Game-Theoretic Approach
用博弈论模型分析股权集中度与企业控制权的关系，提出控制联盟形成成本与投票权博弈中的权力指数，构建了企业静态与动态理论，解释股权分散伴随企业增长的现象。
A model of the shareholder constraint is described in terms of the relationship between shareholding concentration and corporate control. A unified perspective (including takeovers as a special case) is developed whereby leading coalitions are costly to form and possess power in a shareholder voting game. Control is defined in terms of power indices for simple games. A static theory of the firm is developed in terms of the optimal formation of controlling coalitions. A dynamic theory of an owner-controlled firm is described which explains increasing shareholding dispersion accompanying growth. Copyright 1987 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.