Time Consistent Taxation by a Government with Redistributive Goals
研究一个关注公平与效率的动态经济中，即使政府拥有非扭曲性税收工具，时间一致性问题仍会出现，并探讨了自我执行的社会协议如何缓解过度再分配倾向，以及约束最优均衡中通常采用线性税收安排。
In a dynamic economy whose government is interested in both equity and efficiency, time consistency problems arise even if the government has access to nondistortionary tax instruments. Moral hazard in production leads to a nondegenerate distribution of income, which the government would like to “flatten” ex post. Self-enforcing social agreements can mitigate the tendency toward excessive redistribution. We investigate the nature of the distortions caused by the time consistency problem, and show that in the constrained-optimal equilibrium, usually alineartax schedule is imposed. This remains true if renegotiation of the social agreement is possible.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C7 C73, E6, H21.