Information and the Market for Lemons
重新审视阿克洛夫（1970）的经典逆向选择市场，发现信息不对称加剧不一定减少贸易收益，反而可能增加；改善买方信息则明确促进贸易。
This paper revisits Akerlofs (1970) classic adverse selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Better information on the selling side worsens the buyers curse, thus lowering demand, but may shift supply as well. Whether trade increases or decreases depends on the relative sizes of these effects. A characteization is given. On the other hand, improving the buyers information i.e. making private information public unambiguously improves trade so long as market demand is downward sloping.