Optimal Design of Research Contests
研究在创新成果难以验证、创新者无法直接获利时，如何通过竞赛来采购创新。分析表明，邀请两家供应商创新并竞标奖金是最优的，若供应商不对称则应对最有效率的设置障碍。
Procurement of an innovation often requires substantial effort by potential suppliers. Motivating effort may be difficult if the level of effort and quality of the resulting innovation are unverifiable, if innovators cannot benefit directly by marketing their innovations, and if the buyer cannot extract up-front payments from suppliers. We study the use of contests to procure an innovation in such an environment. An auction in which two suppliers are invited to innovate and then bid their prizes is optimal in a large class of contests. If contestants are asymmetric, it is optimal to handicap the most efficient one.