Time Inconsistency and the Exchange Rate Channel of Monetary Policy
在一个简单开放经济宏观模型中分析货币政策汇率渠道导致的时间不一致性问题，发现相机抉择与承诺下的最优政策存在差异，且相机抉择下产出稳定过度、货币政策惯性不足。
This paper analyses time–inconsistency problems related to the exchange rate channel of monetary policy. Within a simple open–economy macroeconomic model, where the exchange rate is the only forward–looking variable, we show that a difference emerges between optimal policy under discretion and under commitment. Moreover, the nature of the time–inconsistency problem resembles that resulting from standard New Keynesian models: when cost–push shocks occur, the exchange rate channel gives rise to excessive output stabilisation and insufficient inertia in monetary policy under a discretionary policy.