Pairwise Credit in Search Equilibrium
在作者之前分析的物物交换搜索经济中引入成对信用，将违约惩罚设为失去交易机会，发现信用额度可能产生多重均衡，并通过计算示例展示不同信用供给下的均衡特性。
Pairwise extension of credit is introduced into the barter-search economy previously analyzed by the author. The penalty for failure to repay a debt is modeled as the end of trading opportunities. Since credit availability makes access to trade more valuable, there may be multiple equilibrium credit limits. Since the credit limit affects the implicit interest rate and the stock of inventories, it is necessary to check the net impact of the credit limit on the incentive to repay. In a calculated example, with lumpy credit availability, multiple equilibria are very common with a greater credit limit associated with a lower implicit interest rate. With smooth credit availability no multiple equilibria were found. Surprisingly, credit can break the no-production equilibrium.