Disease Forecasts and Livestock Health Disclosure: A Shepherd's Dilemma
研究如何促使卖家披露食品安全信息，发现现金转移无效，而引入有噪声的质量预测可通过简单定价机制实现完美披露，但可能损害卖家利益。
Abstract We analyze how to induce sellers to disclose food safety. With repeated interactions and safety correlated over time, cash transfers alone do not ensure disclosure. Perfect, but costly, testing ensures disclosure with a complex lottery that may be difficult to implement in practice. In contrast, even a noisy quality forecast allows the buyer to induce perfect disclosure with a simple pricing scheme. Forecast introduction may benefit or harm sellers. After introduction, sellers may suffer from increases in forecast precision. As an illustration, we cast our model in the context of Rift Valley fever in an East African livestock market.