Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games
通过设计能引发大量低报价的实验，并使用比以往研究高得多的赌注，发现比例相同的报价在高赌注下被拒绝的可能性更低，且拒绝率随赌注增加趋近于零。
One of the most robust findings in experimental economics is that individuals in one-shot ultimatum games reject unfair offers. Puzzlingly, rejections have been found robust to substantial increases in stakes. By using a novel experimental design that elicits frequent low offers and uses much larger stakes than in the literature, we are able to examine stakes' effects over ranges of data that are heretofore unexplored. Our main result is that proportionally equivalent offers are less likely to be rejected with high stakes. In fact, our paper is the first to present evidence that as stakes increase, rejection rates approach zero.