社会属性与战略均衡:一个餐馆定价博弈

Social Attributes and Strategic Equilibrium: A Restaurant Pricing Game

Journal of Political Economy · 1994
被引 74
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

用博弈论解释相邻餐馆菜单相似但需求悬殊的现象,关键在于消费外部性使受欢迎程度本身成为影响餐馆吸引力的因素。

Abstract

Using a game-theoretic approach, the authors examine possible equilibrium explanations of the often-observed phenomenon that two neighboring restaurants offering similar menus nevertheless experience vastly different demands. The essential aspect of this analysis is the presence of a consumption externality that makes the popularity itself a factor in the determination of the relative attractiveness of the restaurants. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.

消费外部性餐馆定价博弈均衡社会属性